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The US DoD defines Electronic Warfare (EW)
as “Any military action involving the use of the electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the
enemy”. There are three major elements of electronic warfare: electronic
self protection; electronic attack; and, electronic warfare support.
Strike fighters must have their own electronic protection systems to
identify the threat and defend against attack by radar-directed guns,
surface-to-air missiles and fighters. For the highest level of protection
strike forces rely on electronic attack, the jamming and deception of an
enemy's radar and radio communications. Electronic warfare support
includes the reception and analysis of adversary radar and radio
communications to develop an awareness of the defences and their operating
patterns and procedures so that attack or deception concepts can be
planned and successfully implemented.
While not an official element of electronic warfare, the suppression of
enemy air defences (SEAD) is also a critical factor of air combat mission
success, especially in a medium/high threat environment. Advances in
sensors, communications and precision-guided weapons are close to creating
an environment where many air defences can be destroyed rather than just
suppressed (DEAD vs. SEAD).
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The JAS-39
GRIPEN is equipped with the EWS-39
internal EW suite, and can additionaly cary the
ERIJAMMER pod as shown here. |
The capabilities of US and allied forces in
all these areas are tied together to form a total system. As we look back
to the 89 US aircraft lost to MiGs, 197 to SAMs and 2,140 downed by AAA
over North and South Vietnam (1964-1973), and compare these losses to the
two (2) US and three (3) allied aircraft lost to SAMs over Former
Yugoslavia (including both the Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999 operations)
and one (1) combat loss in Afghanistan, we see the fruits of massive
investments in technology, tactics, training and doctrine.
The Threat
According to a BAE Systems unclassified database, from 1973 to 2002 more
than 1,650 aircraft (fighters, helicopters and transports) have been lost
in action to missiles and anti-aircraft fire. The ratio of these losses
has been 49% to IR-guided missiles (including both SAM and AAM natures),
29% to AAA, 14% to radar-guided SAMS and AAMs, and 8% to unknown causes.
Ground fire and SAMs have been by far the most significant worldwide
threat; only about 370 of the 1,650 total were Air combat losses (most
occurring in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1982 conflict in Lebanon)
and since 1990 fighters have downed less than two dozen aircraft and
helicopters. During US and allied air operations in “Deny Flight”, bosnia
and Afghanistan aircrew have suffered fewer losses to air defences than to
accidents. This had been due to a focus on electronic warfare, defence
suppression, night operations, improved aircraft and weapons and the use
of medium-altitude tactics, which have minimised the AAA and
shoulder-fired SAM threat. |
